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The discourse of Globalization had its peak in the 1990’ies. A very broad concept1, the notion of a 
“globalizing” world appealed to optimists and pessimists, the political Left and the political Right – 
but most analysts expected it to be an unstoppable force, the main feature of societal 
development for the foreseeable future. Lots of criticism was heaped upon the concept, but until 
recently, it was rarely questioned if the world might be moving towards less globalization instead 
of more. That, however, is happening in the second decade of the new millennium. 
This paper is about regional integration, looking at it as a version of globalization. Those two 
processes have a lot in common: they are both about more trade a2nd more communication 
across national borders – and the institutions and technologies that enable and are enabled by 
those flows. Globalization points toward a universal process, regionalization towards a regional 
one, but they rest on the same assumption: that the growth of cross-national trade and 
communication is or can be a source of economic growth, thus a possible way to improve living 
conditions for the people involved.2 
In 1999, our volume on economic integration in NAFTA and the EU (Appendini and Bislev, eds., 
1999) was published, looking at a constituent aspect of globalization: the development of 
institutions for economic and societal integration. Globalization is, to a large extent, about 
eliminating barriers to trade and communication, but that doesn’t mean that it only eliminates 
existing institutions. The development of new ones is necessary if those flows are to grow and 
develop – first, to enable the very activity; creating media, establishing standards, protecting 
participants against abuse, etc. Second, to soak up or accommodate the changes that emanate 
from increased volumes and ranges of international trade and communication: the dissemination 
of tools, gadgets, germs and ideas that disrupt individuals and communities and change societies 
all over.  
1 The ”globalization” literature is enormous and definitions abound. In this paper, “globalization” refers to increasing 
international transport and communication, happening in a broad range of geographical and social spaces. 
2 Regional integration can be seen as limiting globalization and excluding non-participating countries from the benefits 
of integration. But it can also, at least in principle, enable negotiations towards more universal arrangements.  
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 NAFTA and the EU were very much children of the globalizing wave.  The North American Free 
Trade Area that came into being in 1994 was originally intended to be an American Free Trade 
Area that would harvest the benefits of the huge diversity of the American continent. Political and 
economic interests came in the way, and even the three-party NAFTA was a hard sell to 
populations and politicians wary of the effects of lowering protection. Preceding NAFTA, the 
European Union was established in 1993 on the basis of European integration schemes developing 
since 1955. It was built partly on the same neoliberal assumptions, strongly championed by the 
USA through the post-war cooperation on economic and industrial policy. It retained, however, 
also a second leg: the European tradition of industrial and social protection would be continued 
through active industrial policies, partially harmonized through the European Economic 
Community. The USA being hegemonic in North America, social and industrial policy was not 
allowed to be part of NAFTA’s agenda. 
In Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (1947), a clash between market-liberal policies (that he 
calls the establishment of a “market economy”) and the social foundations of a society is seen as 
the cause of the disastrous developments in Europe, 1914-1945. He criticizes the dominant 
economic philosophy, where “labor, land and money” are theorized as commodities in a market. 
To Polanyi, that is a mistake; they are societal preconditions for markets, institutions that support 
and enable the market mechanisms, and protect societies from the ravages of unfettered 
competition. In his analysis, the Gold Standard is the powerful politico-economic tool that forces 
societies to adapt their social and institutional reproduction to a global dynamic that does 
extensive damage to the fabric of society and exposes the institutions of democratic capitalism to 
a number of dangerous forces. 
Inspired by Polanyi’s analysis – and the obvious, if superficial, parallels to things happening after 
the financial crisis from 2008 - we look at the institutional developments of the EU and NAFTA as a 
struggle between the forces that reproduce civil society (“labor”), the natural habitat (“land”) and 
the systems for exchange and distribution (“money”) – and the powerful neoliberal interventions 
of the two regional economic agreements. This paper is mostly about the EU, the comparison with 
NAFTA still needs to be developed. 
Institutions 
Institutions are the conditions that shape the possibilities for social action. And when social forces 
(movements, governments, politicians…) decide to shape or re-shape society, they need to build 
institutions that can embody the desired changes and direct the development towards intended 
goals3.  
3 Social science has known several types of theories that assumed the existence of impersonal mechanisms, even 
“laws of nature”, that would decide on the path of development. Theories of market economics are perhaps the most 
prominent, and the contestation between radical liberalists (recommending the elimination of as many regulations, 
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The two integration schemes, NAFTA and the EU, aimed at affecting societal development through 
institutional change: NAFTA is explicitly about “free trade”, and would eliminate as many national 
trade regulations as possible: the EU, coming from the industrial cooperation of the EEC, ventured 
on a more liberal course, the “Single Market”, where national regulations would be eliminated. In 
the Union, however, cooperation would include science and technology. The main focus was to 
enhance efficiency and productivity, and in the EU’s vision, “free markets” were not sufficient to 
do that. 
Institutions can thus be analyzed as the independent variable in an analysis of the trajectories of 
societal development in North America and Europe: if NAFTA does not attain its declared goals, or 
their side effects tend to overshadow the improvements achieved, one can look to the institutions 
that constitute NAFTA to see what it is that has been wrong or insufficient. Likewise, if the 
complicated institutional build-up of the EU fails in reaching the most explicit goals, one can ask 
what it is in the EU institutional structure that has failed. 
Thinking like that, institutions become independent variables, and economic and social 
performance the dependent ones. This, of course, is too simplistic: economic and social 
developments very much affect the workings of institutions. The interplay between agency, 
institutions and objectives is complicated. The main thesis of this paper is that the liberalist 
ideologies that dictated economic and social regulations be eliminated, were a causal factor in the 
failure of integrating institutions. But it was of course not the only failure, and possibly not the 
deciding one. Instead, what one may be able to conclude, is that they had negative effects on the 
lives of people in North America and the EU, and should have been supplemented with advances 
in social protection and democratic procedures. 
NAFTA 
The unique challenge to NAFTA at the very inception was to embark on a trade agreement 
between extremely unequal partners – economically, socially and politically. The asymmetric 
structures of the three countries were hotly debated by future stakeholders and civil society, prior 
to the final agreement. There was no doubt that the US would be dominant, and Canadians feared 
for their welfare state, while Mexico feared the effects of the enormous economic powers of the 
US. In the US, fears of undercutting labor standards were broadly voiced. NAFTA added two extra 
agreements, right from the beginning - on the environment, NAAEC, and on labor, NAALC. While 
the NAAEC led to the establishing of committees to harmonize environmental protection, the 
NAALC, aiming at securing the rights of workers and unions, had very few effects. Apart from these 
two agreements, the notion of protecting existing national structures and institutions was aired by 
protesters and critics, but with little effect. 
i.e. institutions, as possible) and institutional economists is still ongoing. Another example of non-institutional social 
science is Karl Marx and his most revolutionary followers; they believed that after a revolution, society would be led 
by spontaneous decision-making by an essential mass of “people”. 
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Mexico was still a developing country; most economists would recommend some element of 
“infant industry” protection to be established, to allow time for the development of competitive 
industry. Even before NAFTA, Mexico was on the liberalizing road, eliminating a large part of its 
extensive complex of social and industrial protection measures: the ownership of land was vested 
in traditional communities, and there was a large sector of publically owned and controlled 
businesses. The immediate effect of liberalization as a consequence of NAFTA was not very large 
(Puyana, 2010), but the ambitions were high: The neoliberal ideology of the NAFTA agreement 
assumed that the very elimination of traditional institutions was not only necessary to enhance 
efficiency; it would automatically and immediately lead to the establishment of modern 
institutions, and a thriving market economy. Mexico had to make profound reforms of its 
fundamental institutions, such as articles of the Constitution which ruled property rights over land 
and natural resources, labor rights, and foreign investment. New institutional settings were 
created to implement policy changes in order to facilitate a full-fledged market economy. The 
inherited government institutions of the Mexican state were overtaken by the challenges that 
followed. 
The expectation was for Mexico to be a major supplier of industrial and agricultural goods to the 
US; traditional trade theory has it that this will benefit both parties – Mexico increasing its exports, 
the US getting cheaper goods. And both happened, initially – although the effect was limited. 
However, the other side of such advantageous changes is often neglected: the dynamics of change 
that affects the social order and thereby alters its own preconditions. Mexico was achieving a 
permanent status as a supplier of cheap goods to the huge neighboring market. That meant an 
influx of investment and export income to Mexico, but it also affected sectors of the Mexican 
economy that were unable to compete with the powerful US companies. The maquiladoras 
attracted American (and other) capital, but the special conditions provided for investments there 
might lock the local economy in a situation where it played the role of providing cheap labor and 
industrial sites and not much else.  
The low-cost situation created tension, but Mexico also initiated industries higher up in the value 
chain: high tech industries, car production and other sophisticated industries grew at a brisk rate 
(Puyana, 2010). A series of economic crises, however, put a stop to the positive development. One 
reason was that much of the supply of industrial goods and materials shifted to China as the new 
dominant supplier. The presumptions of NAFTA – that the massive liberalization of the Mexican 
institutional landscape would lead to growth and development – did not foresee the structural 
shifts that are endemic in any market economy. The growth of Chinese global engagement 
gradually choked off the growth impulse from US demand, as more and more industrial goods 
were sourced from China (Peters and Gallagher, 2013). 
NAFTA did not support the Mexican government in its struggle to support the reproduction and 
development of social standards, natural environment and systems of exchange. Instead, a feeble 
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and unstable Mexican government fought and fights an uphill battle with societal problems that 




The institutions of the EEC were, already from the beginning (1957), loaded with the difficult task 
of constant adaptation to industrial and social conditions. The EEC was not merely a free trade 
area – like the EFTA, established 1960 as an alternative for the less integration-minded - but a 
more ambitious agreement, where the huge industrial and social challenges emanating from the 
rebuilding of warn-torn Central Europe, were addressed. It aimed at creating a customs union and 
common policies on agriculture, transport, trade and nuclear power. From the beginning, the 
implications for political issues related to national sovereignty were discussed, but the existence of 
such implications were taken for granted: in the original EEC treaty the words “working towards an 
ever closer union” were already included, meaning that arguments for more integration were 
automatically stronger than arguments for less. 
The European “Economic Community” changed its name to “European Union” in 1993, when the 
Treaty of Maastricht was approved. It created the foundations for a more consistent philosophy of 
integration, an “Internal Market”. This was not only a neoliberal project of “freedom of movement 
for people, capital and commodities”. It also contained clauses for more political and social 
cooperation, in continuation of European traditions for welfare states and the social market 
economy. 
Unlike NAFTA, that never managed to expand free trade to more American states, nor widened its 
areas of cooperation into labor issues as planned, the EU fulfilled its purpose of expanding 
cooperation, both in terms of new members and new policies. Those expansionary ambitions have 
been contested, of course: lots of interests are vested in any status quo regarding economic 
regulation. The next section details some of the trajectories leading to more integration – and 
towards the current crisis of the EU: the aggregation of contested issues has led to the current 
situation (2017), where most of the EU’s policies are viciously contested and the support for 
European integration, though broadly held and distributed, is retreating from the public eye. 
The introduction of the Euro and the “Schengen” system (abolition of border controls) in 1999 
strained the legitimacy of the EU, and both could only be agreed upon for a subset of member 
states. After that, the vast expansion of EU membership in 2004 (with additions in 2007 and 2013), 
raised even more doubts about the progress of integration, and the global finance crisis from 2008 
put the cap on. The Greek Euro crisis from ca. 2012, the immigration debacle in 2014-15, and the 
UK exit referendum in 2016 epitomized the institutional crisis, but were somehow expected 
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and/or explainable: the Euro was established with the weakest of political superstructures, hardly 
enough to maintain a common currency in such a diverse group of countries. And the weakly 
founded migration policy broke down when migrations assumed a size never foreseen in EU 
deliberations. Perhaps more surprising was it when in 2016, Hungary and Poland openly 
questioned the liberal-democratic values that have been the cornerstone of the EEC and EU all the 
way through – from the Brussels Treaty through Maastricht and the Copenhagen Criteria, 
established in 1993-95 and confirmed in 2002 at the time of the big East European opening.  
The EU Institutions 
 
The decision mechanisms of the EEC and EU were always – and are still – quite complicated, and 
quite unlike anything familiar to political science. When Schmitter asked, in 1998, “How closely will 
it resemble he forms of political domination that we are used to dealing with, i.e. the national 
state and the intergovernmental organization?”, he immediately answered that it will not end up 
being a “rerun” of familiar forms of political institutions (Schmitter, 1998).   In the late nineties, it 
was evident that the growth of membership and functional coverage the EEC was undergoing, 
would lead to a growth in its bureaucracy and changes in the division of labor among the different 
parts of the decision mechanism. From the beginning, the Commission and the Court were the 
foremost actors in developing and deciding on EU policies, reflecting the thinking of the dominant 
figures in the establishment of the EEC: the involved diplomats, jurists and ministers (and the 
occasional Count) saw the professional deliberation in policy-making (Commission) and 
adjudication (Court) as the core processes in an institution with a clear purpose and a complicated 
task. 
The tendency of institutions to lag behind the development of new challenges to the governance 
process may be a general one:  
“Unless we assume that a political environment is stable, it is likely that the change in the 
environment will exceed the rate of adjustment to it….By constraining political change, 
institutional stability contributes to regime instability.” (March & Olsen, 1989). 
 In the case of the EEC / EU, this seems to fit the way EU institutions struggle to catch up with 
environmental challenges. 
 
Over the years, the Parliament and especially the Council of Ministers have grown in importance, 
much beyond what anyone imagined in the nineties. The reason is not only the growth of 
coverage and complexity, but also the increasing range and impact of the “popular” side of politics 
– the media, the elections, the parties and movements. The business and government elites can 
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no longer decide policies based on economic and political goals that they define; the 
representations of popular opinion are persistently intervening in decision processes. One 
persisting problem is the double nature of a federation4 like the EU: the political process at 
member state level is intensely “popular”, with political parties, aggressive campaigns, intense 
media coverage, and regular and frequent elections at several levels. Parliaments either select 
governments or have the mandate to topple them. The political process at the Union level, on the 
other hand, is exclusive, with political quasi-parties that differ from the national ones and work 
together in pragmatic alliances, rare elections with low-key campaigns, and no direct influence 
from parliament on the Executive. In this way, the EU polity does not harvest legitimacy from the 
popular political process, and one result is that most populist movements in the EU have criticism 
of the EU as one of their key campaign issues. This has become a major problem now that 
populism seems to be on the rise5. 
In a similar fashion, the European Court does not work as a national Supreme Court – although it 
has succeeded in establishing itself as the uppermost court in the EU. Both the EU court and 
national Supreme Courts are founded on a constitution, legitimizing their existence and providing 
the fundamental clauses for the legal system. However, where Supreme Courts in nations acquire 
their body of precedents from the whole body of national jurisprudence, built through several 
layers of courts, the EU Court is mainly building its own precedents working from the “still closer 
union” and the “three freedoms” precepts. This creates an asymmetry in EU policy-making, where 
negative integration (abandoning regulations) nearly always wins, while positive integration 
(creating new laws and institutions) has a very hard time to get through.  Negative integration can 
frequently be decided by the Court, while positive measures have to work their way through the 
heavy machinery of Commission, Council and Parliament.  
As argued by Scharpf (2010), this emphasis on “negative” integration is a strong (neo)liberal 
stance, supporting the notion that free exchange of everything is fundamentally beneficial to 
society. This meant that many of the protections that citizens of EU nations enjoyed were 
scrapped, and new ones were rarely established. In welfare state debates, what is usually argued 
pro EU is gender equality and equal treatment of people of different ages. Both have a positive 
social effect, but typically, both are negative freedoms: the Court has managed to more or less 
outlaw gender discrimination and discrimination against the old and the young. Positive measures 
(new support mechanisms for the unemployed, industrial support for regions in crisis, etc.) are the 
4 In EU parlance, the word ”federation” has acquired a specific , contestable meaning: a sort of arrangement that 
impinges on national sovereignty and that only the most eager integrationists, the “federalists”, wish for. Here, the 
word is used to mean just an ambitious agreement of nations sharing power, cooperating in practically everything  
and bound together permanently, as the case is (or was – until Brexit).     
5 ”populism” is not easily defined, nor are the causes of the ”populist wave” simple. The precise way of putting this 
development is that a break-up of traditional party structures and alignment gradually occurs in all Western nations 
after the ‘seventies, and that the new political parties have agendas that often go across the inherited divides of class 
and occupation. This coincides with the development of the Internet and the proliferation of communication channels 
that are making political issues more volatile and politics possibly more adversary, less prone to comromises.  
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responsibility of the other institutional elements – Commission, Parliament, Council – where 
things are much more difficult and veto points are numerous.  
Along the way, the EU Court has decided that it must be above national courts in all issues 
touching upon EU regulations. This position is not directly prescribed in the treaties, but has been 
deducted by the Court itself as a logical implication of its role in the fulfilment of the goals of the 
EEC/EU (Slaughter e.a. 1998). This means that national governments cannot legislate to protect 
their domestic population, even if economic dynamics is harmful to them – the same regulations 
must apply to all EU citizens. This stance is logical in terms on integration, but felt by many 
governments (and citizens) as strongly limiting national autonomy. 
These integrationist steps taken by the European Court are not unanimously accepted (Stone 
Sweet and Burnham, 2012), nor opposed. The EU institutions never initiated a serious discussion 
of the principles involved, not even when the EU “constitution”, the Maastricht Treaty, was 
deliberated. The balance between the EU center and the constituent states being in flux, things 
happened in 1999 that accelerated the integration and thus – because of the fluid situation - 
exacerbated the tensions: the common currency, the Euro, was established; and the Schengen 
agreement (free movement for people) became valid for the whole EU, systematizing the free 
movement of individuals. These two “freedoms” – for money and people – were institutionalized 
in The European Central Bank and the Europol. None of those, however, had the necessary power 
to manage their very heavy and wide-ranging responsibilities. Especially the freedom for capital 
was a burning issue, as the national Finance ministries, together with the large private banks, still 
controlled the main levers of the money supply.  And both reforms were for only subsets of EU 
members – perhaps the first sign of a breakup of the assumed unity of purpose that the EU had 
been built on. 
In none of those recent instances of crisis were the EU institutions sufficient to put out the fires 
and initiate the developments necessary to create a constructive climate in the decision processes. 
The wave of populist, media-driven politics that gradually engulfed the Western world, found 
ample material for contesting the “elites” and the “established order”  in those open conflicts. As a 
recent volume on the EU after the latest financial crisis has it: 
“The lack of domestic ownership, the misrepresentation of the benefits of reform, 
and the association with policies that deepened the crisis may erode public support 
for further reform….and for further European integration…” (Caselli, F. e.a. (eds.), 
2016) 
The authors of that volume see the outcome of a double project: an effort at structural, supply-
side based, reforms (i.e., elimination of barriers to interchange) – and a widening and deepening 
of integration. The latter made the EU large and diverse, exacerbating the economic inequality of 
member nations. Comparing with the USA, analyses of household income distribution show larger 
inequalities in the US – but less inequality between US regions than between EU member states. In 
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the EU, poverty is concentrated in the South and the East, making member nations very different – 
while the national tax and spending systems are redistributive, making households of one nation 
less diverse (Caselli e.a., 2016). Thus, the tensions in the EU tend to be between nations and not so 
much between social classes. 
The EU redistributive tax and expenditure systems are one set of institutions that to some extent 
compensate for the inequalities produced by the free markets. Redistribution, of course, is never 
perfect, and the last couple of decades have shown an increasing inequality between the rich and 
the poor (Piketty, 2014). And one serious weakness of social protection in the EU is that is isn’t 
one institution – but 27-28 different ones. While some redistribution exists in all EU countries, the 
form and extent of redistribution varies widely6. And between member states, any step towards 
redistribution is countered by jealous national interest representatives. As the EU Court eliminates 
still more possibilities for discrimination against foreigners, “social migration”, where citizens of a 
country with weak social support trek to countries with more generous systems, becomes more of 
a reality, and the negative image of the Union in the wealthier countries intensifies. 
The free trade among the EU countries, cemented with the “Inner Market” institutions of the early 
nineties, is another set of institutions to ensure and promote the benefits of the EU: the union-
wide harmonization of technical standards, of trade agreements with the outside world, and of 
financial and legal standards, enables an extensive exchange of people, goods and services. That 
has a double function: the stimulus to economic growth following from the efficiencies gained by 
exchange; and the satisfaction of those people who wish to take part in the innovative economic 
and social developments by migrating to the more interesting places. Migration, however, can be 
an equalizing force if the poor are migrating to richer areas; or a diversifying force if the elites are 
flocking to meet the attractive locations where wealth and innovation are growing. 
 
Comparing NAFTA and the EU, 2000- 
 
This paper is an introduction to a project that will take a comparative look at the integration 
processes in North America and Europe. At the end of the last millennium, we were still looking at 
regional integration as a self-propelling process, driven by the ubiquitous forces of globalization. 
Now, almost two decades later, globalization has been questioned – not just by academics looking 
for a good fight on concepts and quotes (Hirst & Thompson, 1996), but also by powerful political 
forces promoting some form of Nationalism as the answer to the social and political issues of the 
6  A huge literature exists on this comparative European social policies issue. Leibfried and Pierson, eds., 1995, is one 
of the early and more encompassing treatments. 
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day. And in this situation, both NAFTA and the EU are seriously challenged, their strategic aims  
and economic policies disrupted by the anti-global, even anti-liberal forces.  
We propose to develop the understanding of integration dynamics (from now on, including 
disintegration dynamics) by discussing some of the key processes on the integration agenda in 
both regions, seen from an institutional perspective. The last two decades have been a period of 
both important achievements, large failures and increasing tensions. Both regional integration 
projects were looking for progress in all three fields of economics, social affairs and politics:  
- a primary goal of economic benefits was common to both, but viewed differently: Mexico 
and Southern and Eastern Europe expected to catch up with the wealthier North, while 
USA, Canada and most of Europe aimed at staying at the top through the gains from trade 
and cooperation. Europe feared it was losing out on the productivity race, and needed a 
boost of efficiency. The US needed a stable source of cheap raw materials, interim goods 
and labor. All participants got some of what it wished for, but none got all, and problems 
emerged along the way. 
- Social progress was also a goal - for Europe, explicitly: social progress in the poorer regions 
was always an objective, and economic growth was as much an enabler as a cause of social 
progress. NAFTA took the radical path of ‘hard’ neo-liberalism: in the US, industries fled the 
high-cost areas in the North and went south in search of cheap inputs, without a safety for 
those left behind.  In Mexico, the liberal reforms took away the traditional protection of 
workers, farmers and small industries, and social betterment was supposed to be an effect 
of economic growth; the needs for new institutions to secure the progress were largely 
ignored. 
- Both arrangements also looked to progress in political processes: NAFTA had no explicit 
common political objectives, but for Mexico progress in stabilizing democracy was 
necessary to enable both economic and social progress. It did not work out well – the 
effects of social and economic disruption were felt almost from the beginning:  the 1995 
financial crisis, the persistence of poverty, migration and more recently, the violence of 
organized crime. In Europe, while economic growth was thought to immediately underpin 
democratic regimes including the marginal populations and regions in the European 
community, there was also a manifest declaration of intent to advance liberal democracy – 
the Copenhagen Principles.  Recently, the new “populism” seeks to challenge the whole 
liberal construct. 
These broadly formulated issues can be studied from numerous angles; a few broad examples: 
1. Macro-economy: the economic impact of integration: trade, investment, GNP, etc. , and 
the development of macro-economic institutions (national, federal, regional and global) 
2. Industrial economy: structural shifts, competitiveness and concentration, regional 
integration of industries, worker displacement.   
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3. Social and political issues: migration, shifts in migration patterns, poverty, social and 
political security, political processes, governmental institutions. 
4. Agriculture: structural change, policy, concentration and exclusion, enhanced inequality 
between producers and regions.  
5. Global concerns: the roles of China and Russia, NATO, UN, WTO – in trade, in 
environmental issues, in political matters.  
 
The present proposal aims at setting an agenda for the discussion of key subjects or themes in 
these areas, maintaining the institutional focus. The proposal follows up on a Conference 
organized by CBS in February 1997 (papers published in Appendini and Bislev, eds., Economic 
Integration in NAFTA and the EU. Deficient Institutionality. MacMillan/St.Martin’s Press, 1999). 
Twenty years later, the integration processes in both regions are facing economic and social 
uncertainty, and the necessity of developing an understanding of the process seems evident.  
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